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This paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of
outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic
opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option
for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when IMF loans are
unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an
efficiency tool to ensure efficient allocation of resources in the presence of market
frictions. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong
opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would
require IMF financing to be subsidized. [JEL F33, D82]
I
MF programs are in essence incentive schemes.1A country is rewarded with IMF
financing if it implements certain policies and achieves certain outcomes. For an
IMF program to be successful, its conditionality should be designed to provide a
government with the “right” incentives to adopt necessary policy changes.2 In other
words, the government should be willing to implement reforms. This willingness is
often referred to as “ownership” of a reform program.3
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for valuable advice, support, and encouragement throughout this project. Ivanova thanks Akito Matsumoto
in particular, for numerous enlightening discussions. She is also grateful for the comments of Robert Staiger,
Peter Eso, Paolo Manasse, Alex Mourmouras, Nienke Oomes, and Bill Sandholm.
1This view of IMF conditionality was first suggested in Dixit (2000).
2This will also help ensure that IMF resources are repaid.
3A formal definition of ownership adopted by the IMF is as follows: “Ownership is a willing assump-
tion of responsibility for an agreed upon program of policies, by officials in the borrowing country who
have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the pro-
gram is achievable and is in the country’s own interest” (IMF, 2001b, p. 8).One of the proposals to enhance program ownership through conditionality
design is greater use of outcomes-based conditionality,4 under which IMF financ-
ing is conditional on the member country’s meeting particular targets or objectives
rather than implementing specific actions (policies). From a practical point of view,
outcomes-based conditionality5 in some cases has clear disadvantages because the
results of certain reforms may not be seen for a long time and delaying financing
until then may be difficult when financial crisis is imminent. Hence, outcomes-based
conditionality is likely to be more appropriate for medium- and long-term programs.
At the same time, many quantitative targets (such as reserve targets) currently
employed by the IMF are in effect outcomes-based conditions.
Outcomes-based conditionality is viewed as “reducing the perception of micro-
management of countries’economic policies and helping foster and build on coun-
try ownership, by giving the authorities greater flexibility to design their own
economic policies” (IMF, 2002, p. 8). Drawing on the risk-sharing result of the
standard principal-agent model with unobservable action, IMF (2002) concludes
that making financing conditional on outcome would strengthen the incentives of
the authorities to achieve a better outcome.
This result, however, hinges on the ability of the principal to stick to the pre-
committed schedule, which provides less financing (or no financing at all) in case
of an undesirable outcome. It also implies that conditionality can be designed in a
way that ensures that the outcomes are not achieved by unsustainable or inappro-
priate policies.6 Is outcomes-based conditionality still a good option for the IMF
when commitment is an issue and when reforms face opposition from domestic
lobbies that can divert authorities from sound economic policies?
This paper addresses this question by analyzing the role and optimal design of
conditionality within a consistent theoretical framework with a clearly defined objec-
tive function of the IMF. To model opposition from an outside lobby, I employ a com-
mon agency approach following Mayer and Mourmouras (2002)7but with stochastic
outcome of policy reforms and policy action unobservable to the IMF.
Despite numerous discussions on the topic, to my knowledge, there is only one
formal model of IMF outcomes-based conditionality—namely, the model of the
IMF as a co-insurance arrangement in Chami, Sharma, and Shim (2004). The model
focuses on the need for precommitment in the context of time-inconsistency but does
not address the role and optimal design of outcomes-based conditionality in the pres-
ence of opposition.
Most of the existing theoretical literature on conditionality, indeed, focuses on
the problem with the donor’s commitment to enforcing the conditionality contract.
4The approach was advocated by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984) and discussed in Khan and Sharma
(2003) and IMF (2001b and 2005a).
5At the moment, IMF conditionality is already a mix of policy-based and outcomes-based condition-
ality. Thus, the issue is really whether the relative importance of outcomes-based conditionality should be
increased.
6A recent review of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (IMF, 2005b) suggests that this may not be the
case in practice and points out the risk that conditions might be met in unacceptable or suboptimal ways.
7A common agency framework was proposed in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and was further
developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1996 and 1997).
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istic preferences. Some of the models employ the principal-agent framework (for
example, Svensson 2000 and 2003; and Azam and Laffont, 2003).
Models of IMF conditional lending are rare and often do not provide clear jus-
tification for IMF objective function. In Drazen (2002), for example, the IMF cares
about “extracting” policy reforms from the borrowing government but faces some
financing constraints. Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) define IMF objective more
explicitly—namely, the IMF seeks to maximize the weighted sum of utilities of
IMF borrowers and lenders but without justifying why IMF financing is required.
Chami, Sharma, and Shim (2005) take the issue of IMF objective seriously and
show that the size and design of the IMF loan contract crucially depend on the
choice of IMF objective. They explore alternative objectives, balancing IMF con-
cern about safeguarding its resources with concern about country welfare, but limit
the role of the IMF to an altruistic lender.
This paper focuses on a potentially different role that the IMF plays and ana-
lyzes the role and optimal design of conditionality under the nonaltruistic objective
of the IMF. The role of the IMF is twofold: (1) to bridge the inefficiency gap result-
ing from the presence of market failures and (2) to induce policy changes benefi-
cial for the world. The instruments that the IMF can employ to achieve these two
goals are the amount and terms (interest rate) of IMF financing.
Several features of the preferences of the IMF and country authorities make
this model different from the standard principal-agent model. The IMF is not a
typical principal in the sense that it would choose to make a contribution (give
a loan) even if the country had enough incentives to implement the desired policy
changes without the IMF. This is because the IMF plays the role of the world social
planner, which aims at removing the consequences of market imperfections, thereby
benefiting both borrowers and lenders. Also, unlike in the standard principal-agent
model, preferences of the country authorities and the IMF are aligned to some
extent because the government cares about the reform outcome in and of itself—
not just for the sake of obtaining the desired IMF financing.
The results suggest that when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and the
IMF offers financing on market terms, outcomes-based conditionality is a good
option for the IMF. In this case, forgoing the monitoring of policy decisions does
not result in an efficiency loss, and optimal conditionality schedule does not con-
tain an incentive component but simply ensures efficient allocation of resources8
between IMF borrowers and lenders.
Outcomes-based conditionality may still be a good option for the IMF when
resistance to reforms is strong. However, the IMF would have to offer financing at
a subsidized interest rate to be able to use conditionality as an incentive device.
The optimal conditionality schedule in this case would reflect the trade-off between
risk sharing and incentives as the IMF shifts additional risk onto the government.
A careful assessment of benefits and costs of outcomes-based conditionality is
particularly important in this case because the average amount of transfer from the
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8The term “efficiency” is used here somewhat loosely. Its precise meaning is explained later in the text.lender to the borrower required to ensure good policy is higher in the unobserv-
able case than in the observable one.
A better understanding of political economy in the country is crucial in design-
ing an optimal conditionality schedule because its role and optimal design depend
on the strength of opposition. In the presence of outside lobbies, the incentives of
the authorities are shaped not only by the IMF offer but also by the offer from spe-
cial interests.9 Whether reforms are implemented is simply a matter of the compet-
itive power of the IMF versus domestic lobbies, and unobservability may weaken
IMF competitive power. In some cases, however, the IMF may find it optimal to
incur additional costs in order to induce sound economic policies.
The model makes a surprising prediction about transparency of IMF pro-
grams. If the IMF moves first but cannot commit to nondisbursement in the case
of a bad policy choice, it may play to the advantage of the domestic vested inter-
ests. In essence, the IMF cannot strategically manipulate a lobby’s response when
the maximum benefit from the lobby’s contributions to the authorities exceeds
the benefit from IMF financing. The lobby, however, can observe policy actions
and make use of knowledge of IMF conditionality. In fact, the lobby turns out to
be the only “player” who never loses because the IMF cannot monitor govern-
ment actions.
The model is of interest also because in many cases the IMF effectively cannot
monitor government policy decisions or because the monitoring is too costly. The
government may take indirect steps that violate conditionality and even when de
jure the agreed policies are adopted, de facto policies may differ because the inter-
pretation of laws is usually flexible and there are always exceptions to the laws.
I. The Model
Conditionality is a tool for achieving the objectives of an IMF program. Hence, in
designing conditionality, the issue of paramount importance is to clearly identify
the objective function of the IMF. The objectives spelled out in the IMF Articles
of Agreement (IMF, 1992) clearly emphasize the global nature of the organization,
which intends to strike a balance between individual country borrowing needs and
the stable functioning of the world economy.
The requirement of adequate safeguards for making resources available to
members experiencing balance of payments difficulties indicates the noncharita-
ble nature of the organization. In the past decade, however, the IMF has become
more involved in supporting macroeconomic stabilization in poor countries, where
the objective was more that of equity than efficiency. This paper focuses solely on
the efficiency objective of the IMF, leaving aside poverty reduction concerns,
which are better described in the context of conditional aid literature.
9On the weakening of incentives in settings with multiple principals and multiple-task agents, see
Dixit (1997). In this model, the principal can make negative marginal payments for the outcomes of tasks
that are primarily of interest to the other principals, thereby obtaining insurance against those outcomes.
This is true for all principals, and this overprovided negative externality leads to a weakening of incentives
in the Nash equilibrium.
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ence is seen as necessary to close the inefficiency gap resulting from the presence
of market failures although the types of market failures and the type of IMF
involvement are rather different. Resource allocation may not be efficient in the
presence of market failures owing to (1) informational asymmetries, (2) the pres-
ence of externalities, or (3) missing contracts.
Sachs (1999) stresses that informational asymmetries prevent the lender from
distinguishing insolvent from illiquid banks/countries, which leads to an under-
supply of loans or reluctance to roll over existing debt (adverse selection problem).
Rogoff (1999) and Frankel (1999) emphasize the presence of externalities from
financial crises that may spill over to other countries, whereas Tirole (2002) empha-
sizes externalities that different lenders impose on each other by contracting with
the government simultaneously. Tirole (2002) also suggests that market failures
can result from missing contracts—although foreign investors are affected by the
actions of both private borrowers and domestic government,10 they can only con-
tract with the former, which leads to a possibility of government moral hazard if
the government favors interests of domestic borrowers over foreign investors.
The proposed solution is either IMF conditional rescue financing itself or
entrusting the IMF with a function of delegated monitor, which would substitute
for missing contracts between international lenders and the domestic government
and ensure an efficient supply of private financing. Following these proposals, the
objective of the IMF adopted in this paper is to design conditionality to ensure effi-
cient allocation of resources between IMF borrowers and lenders. IMF conditional
financing in this case may be interpreted not only as the IMF loan per se but also
as the total amount of financing the country would receive from official and pri-
vate parties if it fulfills IMF conditions.
The IMF has to design its conditionality facing political realities. These realities
often involve reform opposition, such as powerful vested interests (lobbies) who
benefit from distorted economic outcomes but not directly from the IMF loan. The
lobbies may offer the government a deal that would divert it from implementing
good policy. Thus, the IMF and the lobby act as principals that try to influence pol-
icy (action) taken by the government (agent)—hence the term “common agency.”
Unsound economic policies may lead to the outcomes that benefit the lobbies
but negatively affect the welfare of the general public. Distorted outcomes are cap-
tured in the model by an index of economic distortions ω∈ [0, ω –].11 Distortions are
linked to the policy decision a ∈ A (where A is a set of policy options) of the bor-
rowing country government but also reflect factors outside of government control
as well as unobservable shocks. Hence, government policy choice (for example, the
decision not to reform the banking system) cannot be perfectly inferred from the
observed outcomes (for example, insolvency of a particular bank). Distortions in
the borrowing country may spill over through trade and financial channels to other
countries, thereby reducing world welfare.
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10Government holds many unique control rights in fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, taxation, and insti-
tutional infrastructure matters that can affect the return of foreign investors.
11These distortions are different from distortions in Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) in that here the
index of distortions is a random variable whereas in Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) it is a choice variable.12This formulation abstracts from the possibility of default, which is central to the relationship between
private borrowers and lenders. Although it may seem that by ignoring default issues, the main conflict of
interest between borrowers and lenders is eliminated, in practice IMF loans have almost always been repaid
with interest (Rogoff, 2002). Because the IMF is a preferred creditor, as a practical matter default is not a
primary issue for the IMF. For justification of conditionality from the borrower-lender perspective, see also
Khan and Sharma (2003).
13The IMF levies market-related interest rates for nonconcessional financing, which is based on the
SDR (Special Drawing Rights) interest rate that is revised weekly to take into account changes in short-
term interest rates in the major international money markets. It charges higher interest to the borrower (the
rate of charge) than the interest rate accrued to the lenders (rate of remuneration), with the difference cov-
ering the cost of IMF operations.
The IMF provides financing on the condition that the country undertakes
reforms necessary to address the causes of payment imbalances. Conditions might
specify particular steps that have to be taken to implement these reforms and/or
specific outcomes that have to be achieved as a result of these reforms. The IMF
has to design a conditionality schedule before the government makes its next pol-
icy step and before uncertainty about economic distortions has cleared, although
the disbursements take place after the outcome of reforms has been observed.
If the IMF can monitor government policy decisions, both policy a and out-
comes (the degree of distortions ω) can be specified as a precondition for lending
(this is a mix of policy-based and outcomes-based conditionality). If policy choice
cannot be perfectly monitored by the IMF, the disbursements are tied to the observed
outcomes ω only (this is pure outcomes-based conditionality).
The IMF and the lobby may “move” simultaneously if the IMF reacts quickly
to changes in the domestic political environment, or the IMF may precommit to a
certain conditionality schedule before the lobby approaches the government. In
period zero, both principals offer schedules: a menu that ties policy (action) if it is
observable and the resulting economic outcomes (the degree of distortions) with
the amount of contributions or disbursements. The government makes its policy
decision after having analyzed both schedules.
For simplicity, assume that there are only two policy options: “good” and “bad.”
Any outcome ω may arise under any policy choice; hence, it is impossible to per-
fectly deduce policy from observed outcomes. The distribution of outcomes (distor-
tions) conditional on the adoption of bad policy first-order stochastically dominates
the distribution of distortions conditional on the adoption of good policy. Hence, on
average, the level of distortions is higher under the bad policy choice.
After the outcome of reforms (degree of economic distortions ω) has been
observed, the IMF disburses its loan T and the lobby contributes C according to
their respective schedules. Figure 1 summarizes the timing when the IMF and the
lobby move simultaneously.
A representative consumer in the borrowing country can use IMF loan T either
for immediate consumption C1 or investment I. The loan has to be repaid12 in the
next period at an interest rate rB.13 For simplicity, we can think of a representative
lender-member of the IMF that finances a loan to the borrowing country.The lender
is remunerated at the rate rL. The borrowing country can lend at a private market
interest rate r* but cannot borrow from the private markets, whereas the lender is









Uncertainty about ω clears and payments are
exchanged
Home and foreign residents choose
investment and private borrowing
Production takes place and the loan is
repaid
IMF
1T(ω,a) is the schedule the IMF offers when policy choice is observable, and 
T(ω) is the schedule the IMF offers when policy choice  is unobservable.
Figure 1. Timing When the IMF and Lobby Move Simultaneously with
Observable/Unobservable Policy Choice
constrained to lend. The liquidity constraint reflects the presence of market frictions,
which may arise owing to informational asymmetries, externalities, or missing
contracts.
In principle, the IMF has two instruments with which to achieve its goals: the
amount of the loan and the interest rate. Although in practice the IMF employs
only the former, both instruments might be required to manage IMF objectives.
For simplicity, I analyze only two cases: (1) the IMF loan is provided at effectively
market interest rate and (2) the IMF loan is subsidized.14
14Under effectively market rate, the IMF charges the borrower an interest rate slightly higher than the
market rate, rB = r* +θ> r*, whereas the lender is remunerated at an interest rate below the market rate,
rL = r* −θ< r*, but when θ approaches zero. Under the subsidized rate, rB = rL = r* − s.The model can be solved backward starting from the problem of a representa-
tive consumer in the borrowing country who chooses the amount of investment
and private borrowing, solving
where Y0 is the national income (endowment) in period 1 and δ > 0 is the discount
rate. The properties of the production and utility functions are described in Ivanova
(2006).
The solution to this problem defines investment I0(ω, T) and private borrow-
ing B0(ω, T) as functions of IMF loan T and degree of observed distortions. The
indirect utility function of a representative consumer in the borrowing country
then can be written as follows:
The properties of the indirect utility function can be obtained by differentiating the
first-order conditions with respect to the parameters.15 When the borrowing con-
straint is binding, the utility of the general public in the borrowing country is
increasing in IMF loan (WT(ω, T) ≥ 0).16 When the borrowing constraint is not
binding, the benefit to the borrowing country depends on the terms of the IMF
loan. If the IMF offers financing at effectively market rate, the borrowing country
does not benefit from IMF loan at the margin (WT(ω, T) < 0) because, when dis-
tortions are high, home residents can lend abroad at a market interest rate r*. If the
IMF offers financing at a subsidized rate, the borrowing country always benefits
from an additional unit of IMF loan (WT(ω, T) > 0).
A similar problem can be formulated for a lender-country of the IMF (see
Ivanova (2006) for details). If the lending constraint is binding, foreign residents
benefit from an increase in IMF lending because it helps to relax the lending con-
straint (W*
T ≥ 0) when the loan is offered at effectively market rate or when the
interest rate subsidy is sufficiently small.17 If the lending constraint is not binding,
the IMF loan reduces welfare in the lender country (W*
T < 0) because in this case the
lender would prefer to borrow at an interest rate r* from the markets.
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15Calculations are available from the author upon request and the results are described in more detail
in Ivanova (2006).
16Although it is not possible to sign the cross-partial, all of the relevant expressions in this paper can
be unambiguously signed.
17When the IMF loan is offered at a subsidy that is sufficiently large, the lender may be hurt by the
IMF loan because the cost of the subsidy, which is borne by the lender, outweighs the benefit from the
additional unit of lending that relaxes the lending constraint.
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83The task of the IMF is to maximize the expected utility of its members—a
weighted average of public welfare of IMF members (borrowers and lenders),18
namely:
where W(ω, T) is as defined in equation (1), W*(ω, T) is as defined in Ivanova
(2006), and γ can be interpreted as the degree of concern of the IMF about the bor-
rowing country.
The government in the borrowing country is concerned about public welfare
but also values contributions from the domestic lobby. When both the IMF and the
lobby can differentiate between the two policies, the expected utility of the gov-
ernment is
where α is the degree of government concern about public welfare, which is defined
in equation (1), and C(ω, a) is the contribution from the lobby for observed distor-
tion level ω when the government chooses policy a.
The lobby benefits from distortions, and the lobby’s expected utility can be
written as
where V(ω) is the lobby’s valuation of distortions, with Vω(ω) > 0.
II. Observable Case
Benchmark Case: The IMF and No Lobby
Proposition 1. When the government policy choice is observable and no lobby is
present, the government chooses good policy and the IMF transfers resources from
the lender to the borrower according to its “minimum” credible schedule T 0(ω),
which also maximizes IMF utility ex post and satisfies19
where λT(ω) = 0 if T0(ω) > 0 and λT(ω) ≥ 0 for T0(ω) = 0.
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18Policy a is also affected by the IMF offer T, but for notational simplicity this dependence is omitted.
19I assume that the IMF cannot offer negative contributions. Perhaps withdrawing financing and thereby
discouraging private lenders could be viewed as a “negative” payment, but it is hard to think of a propor-
tionately higher punishment for higher levels of distortions that would be required in the model to introduce
negative payments.In this case there is no problem with incentives: both the IMF and the govern-
ment dislike distortions and there are no side payments from the lobby. The only
role the IMF plays is to redistribute resources between the borrower and lender to
remedy the presence of market frictions.
When the IMF offers financing at effectively market interest rate, the marginal
utility of the IMF loan is either non-negative in both countries (constraint is bind-
ing) or negative in both countries (constraint is not binding). In this case, equation
(5) implies that the IMF financing maximizes individual utilities of the borrower
and lender, that is, WT(ω, T0(ω)) = 0 and W*
T (ω, T0(ω)) = 0 for those levels of dis-
tortions at which the borrowing constraint is binding in the absence of the IMF. The
IMF, however, does not provide financing T0(ω) = 0 for those (high) levels of dis-
tortions at which the borrowing constraint is not binding. The amount of IMF financ-
ing is just enough to ensure frictionless market allocation ex post when θ→0.
Hence, the IMF acts as a world social planner, and conditionality plays the role of
an efficiency tool even in the absence of opposition.
When the IMF offers a loan at a subsidized interest rate, its “minimum” cred-
ible schedule may deviate from frictionless market allocation owing to the distor-
tions introduced by a subsidy. In this case, the IMF offers non-zero financing up
to the point where the weighted marginal utility of the IMF loan in the borrowing
country is equal to the marginal disutility of the IMF loan to the lender:
In either case, T0(ω) also maximizes IMF utility subject to non-negativity con-
straint given the distribution of distortions conditional on bad policy (the only dif-
ference would be the density function, which should be replaced with f(ω⎟ ab) and
the corresponding values of the Lagrange multiplier when the IMF offers zero). In
this sense, T0(ω) is the minimum contribution schedule to which the IMF can cred-
ibly commit.
Common Agency: The IMF and the Lobby
When the IMF and the lobby move simultaneously (Figure 1) and the policy choice
is observable, the two principals make simultaneous offers that involve contribution
schedules conditional on both policy a and outcome ω. The strategy for each of
the principals in this case is a pair: a schedule relating the principal’s contribution
to the observed outcome under good policy and a schedule tying the principal’s
contribution to the observed outcome under bad policy.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is described in detail in Ivanova (2006),
assuming that neither the IMF nor the lobby can use strategies that involve non-
credible threats.20 In essence, the IMF and the lobby compete with their contribu-
γω ω ω ω WT W T TT , * ,.
00 () () =− () ()
20Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1996) provide a characterization of equilibrium in the common
agency game (Theorem 1). Because the only required assumption to prove this theorem is that government
utility is increasing in contributions of both principals, the proof goes through for the model presented in
this paper, with the only difference being that all utilities need to be replaced by expected utilities.
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85tions to offer the government higher utility for the policy that each of the princi-
pals prefers in the absence of the other principal. The two principals raise their
offers until one of them finds that increasing the bid makes it worse off than if it
were to settle on the policy preferred by its opponent.
Because both principals know each other’s preferences, in equilibrium the
winner needs to provide the government with the same level of utility as it would
attain by accepting the offer that makes the other principal indifferent between the
two policy options.
The “maximum” feasible schedule the lobby is willing to offer for bad policy
satisfies
Similarly, the “maximum” feasible schedule that the IMF is willing to contribute
is the one that provides the IMF with the lowest payoff, still at least as much as
the IMF payoff under bad policy—namely, the schedule that satisfies the first-
order condition of the IMF maximization problem and the following condition:21
It is assumed that when the two principals “tie,” the government chooses bad policy.
Proposition 2. When the government policy choice is observable and the IMF
moves simultaneously with the lobby, two sets of subgame perfect equilibria are
possible:
• If the IMF is a potential winner, (1) the lobby offers its “maximum” feasible
schedule for bad policy CLobby
max (ω, ab) and zero for good policy, (2) the IMF
offers a schedule for good policy that provides the government with slightly
higher utility than what it could obtain under the “maximum” feasible lobby
contribution by choosing bad policy and offers its “minimum” credible sched-
ule for bad policy, and (3) the government chooses good policy a* = ag.
• If the lobby is a potential winner, (1) the lobby offers zero for good policy and for
bad policy a schedule that reimburses the government for switching from good
policy under the IMF’s “maximum” feasible schedule TIMF
ob max(ω, ag) to bad pol-
icy under the IMF’s “minimum” credible schedule T0(ω), (2) the IMF offers its
“maximum” feasible schedule TIMF
ob max(ω, ag) for good policy and its “minimum”
credible schedule T0(ω) for bad policy, and (3) the government chooses bad
policy a* = ab.
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21Essentially, the question being asked here is, “What is the maximum average lobby’s contribution
for bad policy that the IMF can outbid?” TIMF
ob max(ω, ag) is the “maximum” schedule that the IMF is will-
ing to contribute for good policy and therefore determines the lobby’s maximum contribution that the IMF
can outbid.The resulting policy choice is a matter of the competitive power of the IMF
versus the domestic lobby, and the role and design of conditionality depend on the
strength of the opposition and the terms of IMF financing.
If the IMF offers a loan at an interest rate close to the market rate, the only
schedule that satisfies equilibrium conditions is the IMF’s “minimum” credible
schedule, and the only role conditionality plays in this case is that of an efficiency
tool. This is because, when the IMF offers financing at an interest rate approach-
ing the market rate, government utility at any given lobby’s contribution is maxi-
mized at the IMF’s “minimum” credible schedule, which removes the borrowing
constraint. Because ex post the IMF is always better off by proving financing
according to its “minimum” credible schedule and the government does not bene-
fit from borrowing more than it would in a frictionless market, the IMF effectively
cannot use conditionality as an incentive tool.
If the IMF provides a subsidized loan, the borrower always benefits from the
IMF loan whereas the lender may be hurt beyond a certain level of desired lend-
ing. Hence, the IMF faces a trade-off and in some circumstances may find it
optimal to exchange some of the lenders’ resources for good policy, which
reduces the likelihood of distorted outcomes and benefits the world. In this case,
the role of conditionality is twofold: it is an incentive tool for motivating the
government to implement necessary policy changes and an efficiency tool for
mitigating the presence of market frictions.22 Although the IMF cannot ensure
an efficient market allocation owing to the distortions introduced by a subsidy,
the world may be better off if the IMF offers subsidized financing, provided it
can induce good policy.
Surprisingly, if the IMF were to move first, the lobby could benefit from observ-
ing the IMF schedule if the lobby is a potential winner. In this case, the IMF picks
the point on the lobby’s “reaction function” that provides the highest utility. When
the loan is subsidized and the lobby is a potential winner, the IMF may offer a less
attractive package for good policy than the package it would offer in a simultaneous-
move game because it receives the same payoff (utility under bad policy) irrespec-
tive of the offer it makes for good policy.
The equilibria described above assume that the IMF cannot precommit to
nondisbursement when the government chooses bad policy because such a threat
is not credible (zero disbursement under a bad policy is not optimal for the IMF
ex post). However, if the IMF could find access to a commitment technology, it
might be better off because it may be able to induce good policy even if it cannot
do so without commitment. This is because for a lobby to win in this case, it would
have to reimburse the government for switching from good policy under the IMF
“maximum” feasible schedule to bad policy under zero IMF contribution, which
requires a higher contribution than reimbursing the government for switching to
bad policy under the IMF “minimum” credible contribution.
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22I assume that the subsidy is small enough that, at least for some levels of distortions, the lender would
still benefit from the IMF loan.III. Unobservable Case: 
The IMF and the Lobby (Common Agency)
Unlike the IMF, which can monitor government activities from the outside only to
a certain extent, the domestic lobbies have better information about government
“moves,” including actions that might not be visible to the IMF or indirect steps
whose effect the IMF may not immediately recognize. Hence, it seems reasonable
to assume that domestic lobbies can always observe government policy choice.
When the IMF and the lobby move simultaneously (Figure 1) but the IMF
cannot monitor government policy choice, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
includes (see Ivanova (2006) for details) an additional constraint—an incentive
compatibility constraint, which ensures that, under the optimal contribution sched-
ule from the lobby and the IMF, the government voluntarily chooses the policy
desired by the IMF.
The maximum utility under good policy the IMF can provide the government
with when government policy is unobservable may be lower than that when pol-
icy choice is observable. The maximum IMF schedule TIMF
unob max(ω) satisfies
But now it also has to satisfy the first-order condition from a more constrained
problem taking into account the incentive compatibility constraint.
Essentially, the schedule TIMF
unobmax(ω) determines the maximum average
lobby’s contribution for bad policy that the IMF can outbid under unobservability.
The maximum average lobby contribution that the IMF can outbid under unob-
servability should be no higher than that under observability because now the IMF
faces a more constrained problem. Hence, in some cases the IMF may be unable
to induce good policy under unobservability even if it could do so under observ-
ability, and bad policy will prevail in equilibrium in an unobservable case if it were
chosen in equilibrium in an observable case.
Proposition 3
• If the IMF is a potential winner, a set of good policy equilibria can be described
as follows: (1) the lobby offers its “maximum” feasible contribution for bad pol-
icy and zero for good policy; (2) the IMF offers an outcomes-based schedule
T*(ω) = T*g
unob(ω) that satisfies the individual rationality constraint, the incentive
compatibility constraint, and the first-order condition; and (3) the government
chooses good policy a* = ag.
• If the lobby is a potential winner, the following holds: (1) when the IMF offers a
subsidized loan, there are no pure strategy equilibria in a simultaneous-move
game; (2) when the IMF offers financing at an interest rate close to the market
rate, the bad policy equilibrium can be characterized as follows: (a) the IMF
offers its “minimum” credible efficiency schedule T*(ω) = T0(ω), (b) the lobby
offers zero for good policy and a schedule for bad policy that reimburses the gov-
ernment for switching from good to bad policy under the IMF’s minimum effi-
ciency schedule T0(ω), and (c) the government chooses bad policy a* = ab.
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88When the IMF offers financing at a subsidized interest rate, the optimal sched-
ule reflects the trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. To motivate the gov-
ernment to adopt good policy, the IMF shifts additional risk onto the government,
but the average amount of financing required to induce good policy is higher than
in an observable case. In this case, outcomes-based conditionality serves as an
incentive tool.
Moving towards outcomes-based conditionality, however, does not always
imply shifting more risk onto the government. When the IMF offers financing at
an interest rate close to the market rate, the optimal outcomes-based schedule is
the same as in the observable case, namely, the IMF’s “minimum” credible sched-
ule T0(ω). This is because the IMF cannot make any better offer to the govern-
ment than the schedule that maximizes public welfare in the borrowing country
and, hence, the government’s welfare at any level of the lobby’s contribution.
Under this schedule both individual rationality and incentive compatibility con-
straints are nonbinding.
As in the observable case, under unsubsidized financing the only role condi-
tionality plays is that of an efficiency tool, and there is no loss of efficiency from
unobservability. The IMF is better off switching to outcomes-based conditionality in
this case because even a small monitoring cost or the benefit from the flexibility of
making policy choices would make outcomes-based conditionality more attractive.
Although there are no pure strategy bad policy equilibria when IMF loans are
subsidized, bad policy equilibrium exists if the IMF offers a loan at effectively
market rate. In this case, the IMF’s “maximum” feasible schedule coincides with
its “minimum” credible schedule. The lobby can also induce bad policy equilib-
rium if the IMF moves first irrespective of whether the loan is subsidized.
IV. Conclusions
This paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and optimal
design of outcomes-based conditionality, with a clearly defined objective function
for the IMF—namely, to maximize the joint welfare of its members in the pres-
ence of market frictions and opposition to reforms. The equilibrium policy choice
is a matter of the competitive power of the IMF versus the domestic lobby. Non-
observability, however, weakens IMF competitive power, and the lobby turns out
to be the only player who never loses from the fact that the IMF cannot monitor
policy decisions.
The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the
IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak because it provides the benefit of
flexibility and allows the IMF to save on monitoring costs without loss of efficiency.
The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong oppo-
sition are less clear. Powerful special interests, which extract rents from economic
distortions, can “insure” the government against distorted outcomes. If the lobby
can offer authorities a bribe that outweighs the value of adopting reforms, includ-
ing that of IMF financing, the best the IMF can credibly commit to is to provide
financing to mitigate the presence of market frictions. And nonobservability weak-
ens the IMF’s potential to outbid the lobby.
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offer financing at a subsidized interest rate. The optimal conditionality schedule in
this case reflects a trade-off between risk sharing and incentive and shifts addi-
tional risk to the government. But the average amount of transfer from the lender
to the borrower required to induce good policy is higher in the nonobservable case
than in the observable case.
Without explicitly modeling the benefit from flexibility that authorities obtain
when they can choose their own economic policies, the model cannot answer 
the question on the ultimate effectiveness of outcomes-based conditionality. But the
results suggest that the optimal design and role of such conditionality should be quite
different depending on the terms of IMF financing and the strength of opposition.
Clearly, when the model predicts outcomes-based conditionality to be a good choice
for the IMF, it will remain so when the benefit from flexibility is added to the pic-
ture. When the model indicates an efficiency loss, the benefit from flexibility should
be weighed against the cost of foregoing monitoring of government decisions.
Ultimately, the question on the effectiveness of performance-based incentives
in IMF programs would need to be resolved empirically, but the existing evidence
on the effectiveness of the performance-based incentives in the public sector23
suggests (see Dixit, 2002) that those incentives work well in agencies where per-
formance can be easily and unambiguously measured. It is hard to argue that this
is the case in IMF-supported programs.
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